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The binding nature of circuit precedents established in published
panel opinions is a familiar part of the court of appeals environment.
Sixth Circuit rule 206(c) states that “[r]eported panel opinions are
binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a
published opinion of a previous panel.”2 There can be little doubt,
though, that the second quoted sentence is on firmer ground than the
first. Three-judge panels simply do not overrule other panels’ previous
decisions in subsequent cases in the absence of an intervening Supreme
Court or en banc decision. But that does not mean that subsequent panels
always comply with previous panel decisions. In practice, there are many
techniques courts of appeals judges may use to evade precedents they do
not wish to follow. They may, for example, distinguish the present case
from the precedent on factual grounds and thus reach a decision contrary
to the one directed by the precedent. They may find an earlier (or later)
precedent pointing in a different direction and rely on that precedent
1
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instead of the disfavored one. Or they may even conclude that an
intervening Supreme Court or en banc precedent has undermined the
disfavored precedent, even when reaching such a conclusion is, well, a
reach.
On the one hand, then, there is a strict rule of horizontal stare
decisis. On the other hand, there is a more-than-reasonable suspicion that
judges can evade that rule, at least some of the time. The pertinent issues
for empirical study, then, are: (1) how often do panels of the courts of
appeals comply with their own precedents, (2) under what conditions are
panels more likely to comply with precedent, and (3) under what
conditions are they less likely to comply?
To answer these questions, of course, one must first operationalize
the concept of “compliance” and devise an empirical measure for it. A
number of potential measures of compliance are readily available. In a
previous article on Sixth Circuit compliance with circuit precedent, for
example, I used Keycite positive and negative treatment codes as proxy
measures for compliance and non-compliance.3 Other researchers have
employed Shepard’s Citations for a similar purpose.4 In addition, studies
of lower court compliance with Supreme Court precedent in civil
liberties cases have used a measure of compliance based on the outcome
of the cases involved.5 This outcome-based measure works on the
assumption that precedents typically have a policy dimension in that they
favor one “side” in a particular policy area, e.g., the creation of Miranda
rights6 favors criminal defendants in future cases. Using this measure,
then, one determines whether the judge(s) citing the precedent reach an
outcome in the same policy direction as that of the cited precedent, e.g.,
pro-criminal defendant or “liberal,” to measure compliance.7
In this Article I analyze whether three-judge panels of the Sixth
Circuit reached outcomes pointing in the opposite policy direction than
the precedents cited to support their decisions. The analysis includes
almost 500 citing cases (n = 499). I find that three-judge panels complied
3
Emery G. Lee III, Horizontal Stare Decisis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, 92 KY. L.J. 767 (2003-04).
4
See, e.g., Charles Johnson, Lower Court Reactions to Supreme Court Decisions: A
Quantitative Examination, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 792 (1979) (employing Shepard’s to track
compliance with Supreme Court precedent).
5
See, e.g., Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on
Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297, 302 (1990) (employing “the percentage of liberal decisions
announced by the courts of appeals in each policy area” as the dependent variable in
modeling Supreme Court impact).
6
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
7
See Bradley C. Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court
Civil Liberties Decision, 8 L. & SOC’Y REV. 109, 111-16 (1973).
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with cited circuit precedents’ policy direction in 60.7% of the sampled
citing cases. This estimate of compliance is considerably lower than the
comparable 81.2% figure obtained using Keycite codes to analyze the
same cases.8 Moreover, the overall estimate masks different dynamics in
sampled published and unpublished decisions. The outcome-based
compliance figure is much lower in published citing cases, 54.2%, than
in unpublished citing cases, 67.9%. Indeed, regression analysis reveals
that, in published cases, the policy preferences of the subsequent panel
majority is the key explanatory variable but that in unpublished cases the
direction of the cited precedent is the key explanatory variable. This
finding strongly suggests that there is an important difference between
published and unpublished cases in terms of the discretion judges enjoy
in such cases to reach decisions in accord with their policy preferences.
This provides empirical support for the conventional wisdom that
unpublished cases generally represent “easy” cases, i.e., cases in which
the applicable legal materials point to one and only one outcome.9
The remainder of this Article is organized in the following way.
Part I discusses recent research on measures of compliance, which
suggests that an outcome-based measure of compliance offers a rather
straightforward means of capturing this complex concept. Part II
specifies the hypotheses of interest and explains the data collection and
coding procedures used in this study. Part III presents my findings using
the outcome-based measure of compliance. Overall, I find support for the
hypotheses advanced in Part II. Part III also provides a comparison of the
outcome-based measure to the Keycite measure of compliance. Part IV
provides a brief conclusion along with suggestions for future research.
I. MEASURING COMPLIANCE
Like most other concepts of interest to social scientists,
“compliance” is a complicated matter. It is not always clear what it
means to comply with a previous decision, partly because it is not always
clear what a previous decision actually “holds.”10 To make matters even
worse, quantitative researchers need a measure of compliance that is
valid, reliable, and not overly subjective or dependent on the person

8

Lee, supra note 3, at 781-82.
C.f. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 64 (1997) (illustrating
that hard cases are those cases in which the “relevant legal rules do not lead clearly to a
particular decision.”).
10
See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949)
(discussing how legal concepts develop in the case law through reasoning by example
and tracing the rise and fall of the “inherently dangerous” rule). The basic point here is
that the holding of a case depends on how subsequent cases interpret and apply it.
9
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coding the cases. Three potential quantitative measures of compliance
are readily available: Shepard’s Citations, Westlaw Keycite, and the
outcome-based measure. Researchers have used each of these measures
in the past, but which should researchers use in the future? In a recent
study of state high-court compliance with Supreme Court precedent,
political scientists McClurg and Comparato11 provide much-needed
guidance on this question. McClurg and Comparato carefully divided the
concept of compliance into four “dimensions” of scholarly interest: (1)
the treatment of the legal principle found in the precedent; (2) the
application of the precedent to a specific set of facts; (3) the policy effect
of the precedent in terms of the party favored by the rule found in the
precedent; and (4) the use of the cited precedent to justify the decision in
a specific case.12 They then compared the ability of the competing
measures to gauge compliance with Supreme Court precedent along
these dimensions by creating their own, content-based measure of
compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Gates,13 and
by applying each of these four measures to a sample of thirty-nine state
high-court decisions citing Gates.14
McClurg and Comparato found that each ready-to-hand quantitative
measure of compliance had its advantages and disadvantages.15
Shepard’s is the only measure that allows for a neutral code, i.e., the
“Cited By” code. But because of this, Shepard’s often incorrectly
categorizes compliant or non-compliant behavior as “neutral.”16 The
other measures, however, tend to err in categorizing citations as
compliant or non-compliant when they are really “neutral.”17 McClurg
and Comparato found that Keycite tends to code decisions as compliant
(i.e., “positive” treatment) even when the content-based measure would
have categorized them as non-compliant.18 Keycite, in short, is biased
toward overestimating compliance, compared to the content-based
measure. Similarly, the outcome-based measure is biased toward
overestimating non-compliance, compared to the content-based

11

Scott D. McClurg & Scott A. Comparato, Rebellious or Just Misunderstood?
Assessing Measures of Lower Court Compliance with U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Seton Hall Circuit Review).
12
Id. at 6, 39 (fig. 1).
13
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14
McClurg & Comparato, supra note 11, at 13.
15
See generally id. at 27-29 (summarizing their conclusions on the strengths and
weaknesses of the alternative measures).
16
Id. at 20, 23-24, 28.
17
Id. at 23, 28.
18
Id. at 28 (“[T]he Achilles heal of Keycite is a tendency toward false positives . . .
.”).
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measure.19 The reason for this tendency seems clear. A subsequent
decision may reach a different result and still comply, substantively, with
cited precedent. For example, the facts of the subsequent case may
actually differ in legally relevant ways from those in the cited precedent.
But when this occurs, the outcome-based measure will always code the
subsequent decision as non-compliant.
After examining the performance of each measure of compliance
for each of the four dimensions, McClurg and Comparato combined the
different dimensions of compliance to compare the quantitative measures
of compliance to their content-based measure overall.20 They found that
Shepard’s correctly classified ten of the seventeen non-compliant
decisions in the sample,21 Keycite correctly classified nine out of the
seventeen, and the outcome-based measure correctly classified fifteen
out of the seventeen.22 This last figure (fifteen out of seventeen) makes
sense, because a non-compliant decision will generally point in the
opposite policy direction from the cited precedent. Thus, the outcomebased measure should do a better job than the quantitative alternatives in
identifying non-compliant decisions. In terms of correctly classifying
compliant decisions, however, Keycite performed somewhat better than
the other quantitative measures.23 Most notably, the outcome-based
measure incorrectly classified the seven cases McClurg and Comparato
classified as “weak compliance” as non-compliant.24 Again, this makes
sense, as not every decision pointing in the opposite policy direction is
actually non-compliant. The outcome-based measure will incorrectly
classify every such decision, however.25
In terms of measuring all four dimensions of compliance, McClurg
and Comparato offered the following advice to researchers:
First, for scholars interested in measuring only the treatment of
legal principle [this study] shows that Shepard’s is the best
19

Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 25-26.
21
Seventeen out of 39 decisions were coded non-compliant using the content-based
measure. Id. at 26, Table 6.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 26-27.
24
Id.
25
McClurg and Comparato comment:
[T]he outcome measure is predisposed toward overstating levels of
noncompliance. However, we would be remiss if we did not point out that in
terms of measuring overall compliance, the outcome measure’s false
negatives are almost entirely of a specific type—treating weak forms of
compliance as noncompliance—that is not as clearly egregious of a mistake
as some of those made by the other two measures.
Id. at 28-29.
20
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measure as it has the highest percent correct and is capable of
identifying irrelevance. Both Keycite and the outcome measure
hover around the 50-percent mark and are incapable of dealing
with cases where this dimension is not at all relevant. Second, [if]
interest[ed] in measuring the remaining three dimensions of
compliance [,] scholars would be best accomplished by using the
Keycite measure. On a dimension-by-dimension basis, Keycite is
the superior measure for distinguishing between compliant and
noncompliant lower court cases. Along these same lines,
Shepard’s is by far the weakest of the three measures. Finally, if
we consider all four dimensions together, the outcome measure
outperforms both Shepard’s and Keycite. Although using the
outcome of a case is not useful for measuring one particular
element of compliance, the evidence in the final column of Table
7 suggests that its strength is capturing the concept more
generally. This also has some substantive importance, as it
suggests that compliance is closely linked to . . . case outcomes.26

In sum, the results of the McClurg and Comparato study indicate
that researchers interested in measuring compliance with precedent
“should consider using an outcome based measure” for compliance, in
part because “it has the highest level of content validity with respect to
measurement of the general phenomenon of compliance.”27 At the same
time, researchers should be aware of this measure’s potential bias toward
coding compliant behavior, especially weakly compliant behavior, as
non-compliant.28
In this Article, I follow the advice of McClurg and Comparato and
use the outcome-based measure of compliance to study the efficacy of
the norm of horizontal stare decisis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. This is an important theoretical question in its own right.
Having already conducted an analysis of compliance using the Keycite
measure, in this Article I am also able to compare the two measures and
contribute to the discussion of measurement error in this research area.
The next part explains the hypotheses of interest and the details of the
research design employed in this study.

26

Id. at 28 (citation omitted).
Id. at 32.
28
Id. at 28-29. To test this in another legal context, McClurg and Comparato sampled
search and seizure cases in the state supreme courts and measured non-compliance with
relevant Supreme Court precedents using the three quantitative measures. Id. at 30-31,
Table 8. They found that Shepard’s coded about 0.5% of the sampled cases as noncompliant, Keycite 2.3%, and the outcome-based measure 38.6%. They concluded that
although this 38.6% estimate was “inflated,” it might serve as a kind of “upper boundary
estimate for all forms of noncompliance.” Id. at 31.
27
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II. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Hypotheses
This Article focuses on a limited number of variables, primarily the
composition of panel majorities in the citing cases, the policy direction of
the cited and citing cases, and whether the opinion in the citing case is
published or unpublished. The first hypothesis of interest involves the
policy preferences of the citing panel. Court researchers simply lack
anything resembling a direct, fully satisfactory measure of lower-court
judicial policy preferences. A vast body of literature, however,
documents that judges appointed by Republican presidents have different
policy preferences than those appointed by Democratic presidents.29
With respect to that literature, the leading political science work on the
U.S. courts of appeals concludes that “[t]he general picture presented by
these studies is clear: across a wide variety of courts and issue areas,
Democratic judges are more likely to support the liberal position in case
outcomes than their Republican colleagues.”30 Moreover, the ongoing
controversy regarding the appropriate role of judicial ideology in judicial
confirmations demonstrates that policy-makers recognize that judges’
policy preferences vary according to partisanship.31 Given these
differences in policy preferences, one would expect that a panel
dominated by Democratic judges32 would be more likely to disagree with
a conservative-direction precedent than a panel dominated by Republican
judges, and that a Republican-dominated panel would be more likely to
disagree with a liberal-direction precedent than a Democratic-dominated
panel.33 Thus, the first hypothesis of interest:
29
See DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS 110-119 (2000) (providing a synthetic overview of the literature with
a full-range of citations). Measuring appellate judge policy preferences by reference to
the party of the appointing president certainly has its limitations, but previous studies
have shown that partisanship measured by “presidential cohorts” explains “a substantial
portion of the variation in judicial voting.” Id. at 118. See also Frank B. Cross & Emerson
H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L. J. 2155 (1988).
30
Id. at 112. Throughout the remainder of the Article, I will follow this usage and
refer to judges nominated by Democratic presidents as Democratic judges and judges
nominated by Republican presidents as Republican judges.
31
See Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking Federalist
No. 76 on the Senate’s Role in the Judicial Confirmation Process, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
235, 237-43 (2004), for a useful discussion of the contemporary debate.
32
I.e., a panel on which a majority of the judges are Democratic judges.
33
This should be true regardless of the composition of the panel that decided the
cited precedent. My previous work suggests that it is the policy direction of the cited
precedent and not the composition of the panel that decided the precedent that explains
variation in compliance. See Lee, Horizontal Stare Decisis, supra note 3, at 785-89. For
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H1: Democratic-Dominated Citing Panels Are More Likely than
Republican-Dominated Panels Not to Comply with Conservative
Direction Precedents, and Republican-Dominated Panels Are
More likely Not to Comply with Liberal-Direction Precedents,
All Else Equal.

This relationship will probably not be symmetrical, however. The
policy direction of the cited precedent should also affect the overall level
of compliance, regardless of the composition of the citing majority,
although the reasons for this are not as readily apparent. Overall, I expect
that compliance, using the outcome-based measure, will be greater for
conservative-direction precedents than for liberal-direction precedents.
To understand why, one must consider the nature of “liberal-direction
precedents.” As will be discussed infra, the sample includes only civil
liberties and civil rights cases. Given the court of appeals docket, the
sampled precedents are largely criminal appeals rather than First
Amendment cases or even Title VII discrimination suits. In a criminal
appeal, a liberal-direction decision is almost always a reversal of the
district court in some respect.34 But the courts of appeals affirm the
district courts in an overwhelming majority of cases. Thus, liberaldirection, pro-defendant decisions should be less common than
conservative-direction, pro-prosecution decisions even when the cited
precedent is a liberal-direction precedent. Thus, the second hypothesis of
interest is:
H2: Compliance is more Likely for Conservative-Direction
Precedents than for Liberal-Direction Precedents.

Finally, I expect that the citing panel’s decision to publish the
subsequent opinion will be positively correlated with non-compliance; in
general, non-compliance should be more common in published citing
cases than in unpublished citing cases. This expectation reflects the
conventional wisdom that unpublished cases tend to be routine cases, i.e.,

example, when a policy direction variable is included in the model, the coefficient for the
variable comparing the policy preferences of the citing and cited panels does not reach
statistical significance. See id. at 787 (Table 3). I concluded in that previous Article: “In
sum, the ideological composition of the panels involved is important because of its
consequences for the direction of the [cited] precedent; however, the ideological
composition of the panels, alone, does not explain variation in the negative treatment of
precedents.” Id. at 790.
34
I.e., a liberal direction will almost always be a pro-criminal defendant decision in
that defendant’s appeal of his or her conviction and/or sentence. Thus, almost all such
decisions will vacate the conviction and/or sentence and remand the case for further
proceedings.
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cases governed by clearly established precedent.35 Given the lack of
judicial discretion in such cases, non-compliance should be less likely.
Thus, the third hypothesis of interest:
H3: Compliance with the Cited Precedent is More Likely in
Unpublished Citing Cases than in Published Citing Cases.

B. Data Collection
The sample used to test these hypotheses was collected as follows.
First, precedents decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1995 and 1996 were
identified from the Federal Reporter 3d Series. These years were
selected because previous research has found that the average “half-life”
of a non-Supreme Court precedent cited in a court of appeals case was
4.3 years; i.e., half of the citations to lower federal court precedents
occurred within 4.3 years of its decision date.36 Sampling precedents
from the mid-1990’s, then, should mean that the study will include most
of the citations to the sampled precedents that will occur. For each
sampled precedent, records were made of the case number, the authoring
judge, panel membership, outcome in terms of ideological direction, and
decision date.37 The sample was limited to precedents involving criminal
procedure, including sentencing issues, civil rights claims of race or sex
discrimination, and the violation of federally guaranteed rights.38 Such
cases comprise a significant part of the Sixth Circuit’s docket and, more
importantly, permit one to code the ideological direction of case
outcomes. 39 In this context, the outcome variable was coded “liberal” if
any relief (including partial relief) was granted to the defendant on the
relevant issue in criminal procedure cases, and “conservative” if all relief
35

There is, however, more that one could say on this matter. See Lee, supra note 3, at
790 n.90, and sources cited therein.
36
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 255 (1976).
37
Additional data on variables not discussed in this Article were also collected. See
Lee, supra note 3, at 779-81.
38
In other words, civil rights cases were sampled when they involved either Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The latter category includes several
important cases on the issue of qualified immunity.
39
The sampled precedents can be found in volumes 50-102 of the Federal Reporter,
3d Series. I began with volume 50 and collected data on all published Sixth Circuit cases
meeting the sampling rules until a sufficient number of subsequent citations had been
collected for logistic regression analysis. The author, in other words, examined and did
citation checks on all published criminal procedure, sentencing, and civil rights cases
decided by three-judge panels of the Sixth Circuit that were published in these volumes
of the reporter. Volume 50 was not selected as my starting point for any particular reason,
other than the fact that 50 “seemed like a nice round number.” COOL HAND LUKE (Jalem
Productions of Warner Bros. (u.s.) 1967).
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was denied. In civil rights cases, the outcome variable was coded
“liberal” if the panel held in the plaintiffs’ favor on the relevant issue and
“conservative” when the panel held in the defendants’ favor. The panel
membership variables were coded to reflect the party of the appointing
president of the three judges on the panel.
Subsequent citations to the sampled precedents by three-judge
panels of the Sixth Circuit were then located using the Westlaw Keycite
service.40 Citing cases were included in the sample if the treatment of the
precedent was coded as negative (including “Distinguished”) or if the
treatment was coded as positive and the citing case either “explained” or
“discussed” the precedent. This means that subsequent cases that merely
cited the sampled precedent, positively, without discussion, as in a string
citation, were omitted from the sample of citing cases. The reason for
this coding decision is that such brief “positive” citations generally do
not signal that the citing panel relied, in any substantive sense, on the
cited case for an important question of law. If the citing panel does not
rely on the precedent in reaching its decision, then the citation cannot
really be characterized as “compliance.” By contrast, even a brief
“negative” treatment represents some level of “non-compliance” with the
policy represented in the cited precedent. Unpublished opinions,
including per curiam opinions, were included in the sample of citing
cases.
As with the sampled precedents, records were compiled including
the following information: case citation, the treatment of the precedent,
publication, party of the president appointing the judges on the panel,
case outcome in terms of ideological direction, and the decision date.
The panel membership and outcome variables were coded as in the
sampled precedents. In multiple issue cases, great care was taken to
ensure that the outcome variable was coded according to the direction of
the outcome on the issue or issues for which the precedent was cited.
III. FINDINGS
A. Descriptive Statistics
The data summarized in Table 1 reveal that subsequent panels
complied with cited circuit precedents 60.7% of the time, in all cases,
40

The original study employed Keycite both to find cases and to code the compliance
variable; in the present study, Keycite was used only for the latter purpose. A citing case
is included more than one case in the sample if it cites more than one of the sampled
precedents; the unit of analysis is the citation of precedent rather than the citing case,
strictly speaking. However, there are 422 distinct citing cases in the sample, accounting
for 499 observations (citations to precedent), so few cases are included more than twice.
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measured by the policy direction of the precedent and citing case. In
other words, citing panels did not comply with the policy direction of
cited precedents almost 40% of the time. This percentage is slightly
misleading, however, because the figures for published and unpublished
cases are substantially different. Panels complied with the policy
direction of the cited precedent in 54.2% of published decisions,
compared to 67.9% in unpublished cases. That difference is statistically
significant beyond the .001 level, which strongly indicates that there is a
very different dynamic in published and unpublished cases. Noncompliance with the policy direction of cited precedent occurred almost
half of the time in published opinions.

This finding makes sense if, on the whole, cases decided by
published opinions present more legal ambiguity, and thus greater
judicial discretion, than cases decided in unpublished opinions. Given
greater judicial discretion to reach a decision in accordance with a panel
majority’s policy preferences, one would expect a higher level of noncompliance with previous decisions in such cases. Even so, three out of
every ten unpublished decisions are non-compliant with cited precedent,
according to the outcome-based measure. As will be discussed infra,
however, almost all of that non-compliance occurs when a panel majority
arrives at a conservative-direction result despite citing a liberal-direction
precedent.41
Table 2 displays the results of various cross-tabulations to make the
relationships among the variables of interest more clear. The cited
precedent’s policy direction is clearly related to whether the citing panel
complies with it. Overall, citing panels complied with 35.3% of liberaldirection precedents but more than three-fourths of conservativedirection precedents (76.0%). Non-compliance, in other words, is much
more common for liberal-direction cited precedents than for
conservative-direction cited precedents, as expected. The same general
relationship holds for Democratic-dominated citing panels, which
41

See infra Part III.A, Table 2.
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complied with 36.9% of liberal-direction precedents but 69.7% of
conservative-direction precedents, and for Republican-dominated citing
panels, which complied with 33.3% of liberal-direction precedents but
more than four-fifths of conservative-direction precedents, 83.9%. The
most striking finding here is that the differences between panel majorities
are much greater for conservative-direction precedents. Republicandominated citing panels are much more likely to comply, overall, with
conservative-direction precedents than Democratic-dominated citing
panels (83.9% compared to 69.7%), but Democratic-dominated citing
panels are slightly more likely to comply with liberal-direction
precedents than are Republican-dominated citing panels (36.9%
compared to 33.3%). Non-compliance is much more common for both
Democratic- and Republican-dominated panels when the cited precedent
was decided in the liberal (usually pro-criminal defendant) direction,
although the non-compliance rate of Democratic-dominated panels citing
conservative-direction precedents (31.3%) was almost twice that of
Republican-dominated panels (16.1%). These findings are generally
consistent with the hypotheses advanced in Part II.A.42
The composition of the citing panel is not the whole story, though.
Publication of the citing opinion is also related to whether the citing case
complies with the precedent’s policy direction. Overall, non-compliance
is much more likely in published than unpublished cases, and that
relationship holds when controlling for the policy preferences of the
citing panel. In published opinions, Democratic-dominated citing panels
complied with 43.3% of liberal-direction precedents and 54.2% of
conservative-direction precedents. In other words, in published opinions,
Democratic-dominated citing panels were almost as likely to comply
with a liberal-direction precedent as with a conservative-direction
precedent.
Overall, Democratic-dominated citing panels were non-compliant
with cited precedent in 50% of published opinions. It should be noted
that these differences between liberal- and conservative-direction
precedents in published opinions decided by Democratic-dominated
panels are not statistically significant. But that is, in its own way,
interesting. This is the only cross-tabulation in Table 2 in which the
differences in compliance with liberal- and conservative-direction
precedents are not statistically significant. Democratic-dominated citing
panels are as likely to reach a liberal-direction result when citing a
conservative-direction precedent (45.8%) as to reach a compliant liberaldirection result (43.3%).
42

See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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In published cases, then, the policy direction of the precedent is not
important in determining whether a Democratic-dominated panel will
reach a liberal-direction result; they will do so about four times in ten.
Republican-dominated citing panels, by contrast, complied with 37.5%
of liberal-direction precedents and 74.2% of conservative-direction
precedents in cases decided by published opinion. In other words,
Republican-dominated panels did not comply with 62.5% of liberaldirection precedents cited in published opinions, as compared to 25.8%
non-compliance with cited conservative-direction precedents. These
findings indicate, yet again, that cases decided by published opinions
offer much greater opportunities for judges to decide cases in accord
with (even rough measures of) their policy preferences. In cases decided
by unpublished opinions, there is no real difference between Democraticand Republican-dominated panels in terms of the policy direction of the
results reached; Republican-dominated panels reached conservativedirection results in 84.3% of such cases, Democratic-dominated panels in
82.8%. But in cases decided by published opinion, there is a difference:
Democratic-dominated panels reached a liberal-direction result in 44.9%
of such cases compared to only 30.2% for Republican-dominated panels
(n=262). This difference is statistically significant (at the .05 level).
Publication means that a liberal-direction outcome is more likely,
regardless of the preferences of the panel (but a liberal-direction outcome
is even more likely if the panel has a Democratic majority). For this
reason, both Democratic- and Republican-dominated panels are much
more likely to comply with liberal-direction precedents in published
opinions than in unpublished opinions. Given the findings discussed
supra, it is no surprise that liberal-direction precedents are rarely
complied with in unpublished cases—only 27.9% of the time for
Democratic-dominated citing panels, 29.5% for Republican-dominated
citing panels. On the other hand, this also means that both Democraticand Republican-dominated panels are much less likely to comply with
conservative-direction precedents in published cases, 54.4% and 74.2%,
respectively, than in unpublished cases, 88.6% and 93.0%, respectively.
Indeed, most of the non-compliance observed in cases decided by
unpublished opinions occurred when panels reached a conservativedirection result despite citing a liberal-direction precedent. These
figures further highlight the differences between cases decided in
published opinions and those decided in unpublished opinions.
Republican-dominated panels did not comply with conservative-direction
precedents cited in unpublished opinions only 7.0% of the time.
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B. Logistic Regression Analysis
To further explore the relationships among these variables, logistic
regression analysis was employed.43 Table 3 displays the results of three
separate logistic-regression models: (1) a model for all subsequent
citations of precedent, (2) a model for citations in published opinions,
and (3) a model for citations in unpublished opinions. The separate
models were necessary given the different dynamic present in cases
decided in published opinions compared to those decided in unpublished
opinions.44 The dependent variable in the logistic-regression models is
the policy direction of the citing case, Case Outcome. This variable was
coded as one when the citing case was decided in a liberal direction and
as zero when the citing case was decided in a conservative direction. The
Precedent Direction variable was coded in the same way. Thus, I expect
the coefficient for the Precedent Direction variable to take a positive
sign, meaning that, all else being equal, a citing panel is more likely to
decide the subsequent case in the same direction as the cited precedent.
The Panel Majority variable is coded one for Democratic-dominated
panels and zero for Republican-dominated panels. Thus, I expect this
coefficient to also take a positive sign, because, all else equal,
Democratic-dominated panels should be more likely to prefer a liberaldirection case outcomes and Republican-dominated panels should be
more likely to prefer conservative-direction case outcomes. Publication
is also included in the first model as a control variable.
In the first model, including all citations in published and
unpublished opinions (n=499), both the Precedent Direction and Panel
Majority variables take the expected sign (positive) and reach traditional
levels of statistical significance, although the Panel Majority coefficient
is significant only at the .05 level. The positive sign of the Precedent
Direction coefficient demonstrates that compliance is more likely than
non-compliance, even when controlling for the policy preferences of the
citing panels and the decision to publish. The positive sign for the Panel
Majority variable means that, even controlling for the policy direction of
the cited precedent, the policy preferences of the citing panel still affect
the policy direction of the Case Outcome. Thus, Democratic-dominated
43
Logistic regression is appropriate where the dependent variable is dichotomous,
i.e., where the dependent variable can only take two values. See generally TIM FUTING
LIAO, INTERPRETING LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS: LOGIT, PROBIT, AND OTHER GENERAL
LINEAR MODELS (1994). As discussed in the text, the dependent variable here is the
policy direction of the outcome of the citing case, which can only take the values
“liberal” (one) or “conservative” (zero).
44
Cf. Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs
and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 249 &
n.10 (1992) (employing separate models for published and unpublished opinions).
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panels are more likely to prefer liberal-direction outcomes, and
Republican-dominated panels are more likely to prefer conservativedirection outcomes, all else equal. The coefficient for the Publication
variable is large and statistically significant. This means that a liberaldirection Case Outcome is much more likely in a published opinion than
in an unpublished opinion, a finding fully consistent with the discussion
in Part III.A.

By contrast, in the second model, which includes only subsequent
citations in published opinions (n=262), the Precedent Direction
coefficient does not reach statistical significance, despite taking the
expected sign. This means that compliance is not more likely than noncompliance in cases decided by published opinion; instead, the Precedent
Direction variable is not affecting the Case Outcome variable one way or
the other, once Panel Majority is accounted for. The Panel Majority
variable does reach statistical significance in the second model, although
again only at the .05 level. Some readers may object that the relationship
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between the Panel Majority variable and Case Outcome is only
marginally significant and thus that the relationship between these two
variables is hardly overwhelming. Even conceding that point, though, the
interesting finding here is that in published cases, the policy direction of
the precedent does not affect the policy direction of the case outcome,
after controlling for the policy preferences of the citing panel majority.
In other words, using the outcome-based measure of compliance,
compliance with the policy-direction of cited precedents is not more
likely than non-compliance in cases decided by published opinion. In
terms of the theoretical questions asked at the outset of this paper, judges
on the Sixth Circuit are not likely to comply with the policy-direction of
cited precedents in cases decided by published opinion, according to the
outcome-based measure of compliance.
This becomes even more clear when the third model, which
includes only subsequent citations in unpublished opinions (n=237), is
included in the analysis. The third model indicates that the policy
preferences of the citing panel majority are irrelevant, after controlling
for the policy direction of the cited precedent, in cases decided by
unpublished opinion. In this model, the Precedent Direction coefficient
takes the expected sign and is statistically significant. The Panel Majority
coefficient, though, does not even approach statistical significance,
strongly suggesting that the decisions of panels announced in
unpublished opinions are largely determined by the policy direction of
the cited precedents. The observed differences between published and
unpublished cases could not be clearer.
C. Comparing the Outcome-Based Measure to the Keycite Measure
This Article has presented evidence that compliance with circuit
precedent is not more likely than non-compliance in cases decided by
published opinions, all else being equal, and that the policy preferences
of the citing panel majority explain at least some of the non-compliance
that occurs in cases decided by published opinion. But these findings are
only as valid as the measure of non-compliance employed. Given the
large number of legal issues raised in the sampled precedents, a contentbased measure of non-compliance is simply not practicable in the present
study. But there are alternative measures of compliance at hand,
especially Keycite. How does the outcome-based measure compare to
Keycite’s positive and negative treatment codes? These figures are
shown in Table 4.
Overall, the outcome-based measure coded 60.7% of subsequent
citations of precedent as compliant; thus, it yields an estimate of 39.3%
non-compliant behavior in the sampled subsequent citations. The Keycite
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codes yield corresponding estimates of 81.2% compliant behavior and
18.8% non-compliant behavior.45 The outcome-based measure, in other
words, yielded an estimate of non-compliant behavior more than twice
the size of the Keycite estimate (109% greater). The same general pattern
holds for the estimates for different values of the explanatory variables—
the outcome-based measure of non-compliance typically produces an
estimate of non-compliance approximately twice the estimate yielded by
Keycite. Thus, in cases decided by published opinion, Keycite yielded a
non-compliance measure of 24.8%, compared to 45.8% for the outcomebased measure. For published cases, then, the outcome-based estimate is
85% greater than the Keycite estimate. In unpublished cases, the
estimates of non-compliance are 12.2% for Keycite and 32.1% for the
outcome-based measure; the latter is fully 163% greater than the former.
Despite the different measures, though, the pattern is the same: noncompliance is much greater in cases decided by published opinion,
according to both measures, than in cases decided by unpublished
opinion.

45

Lee, supra note 3, at 781.
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For liberal-direction precedents, Keycite yielded a 24.1% estimate
of non-compliance, compared to 64.7% for the outcome-based measure,
a 168% greater estimate. For conservative-direction precedents, Keycite
produced a 15.7% estimate of non-compliance, compared to 24.0% for
the outcome-based measure, a 53% greater estimate. Again, the estimates
are similar in that both yield greater rates of non-compliance for liberaldirection precedents. But the difference between the outcome-based
measure and the Keycite measure is particularly striking with respect to
liberal-direction precedents. Liberal-direction precedents are not that
much more likely than conservative-direction precedents to receive
negative treatment in subsequent citations (24.1% compared to 15.7%,
statistically significant at the .05 level). But panels citing liberaldirection precedents reach a conservative-direction result almost twothirds of the time. How, exactly, panel opinions justify conservativedirection results in such circumstances without triggering a negative
Keycite code is not clear; but clearly, Keycite codes treat such cases as
compliant. This finding appears to parallel that of McClurg and
Comparato, namely, that the outcome-based measure of non-compliance
tends to code weak forms of compliance (“positive” treatment code) as
non-compliant (opposite policy direction).46 This difference in
measurement may go a long way toward explaining why this Article
finds little evidence of compliance in cases decided by published
opinion. In other words, there is probably more compliance, especially
“weak compliance,” in published cases than is detected using the
outcome-based measure.
For Democratic- and Republican-dominated citing panels, the
outcome-based measures of non-compliance are 119% and 95% greater
than the corresponding Keycite measures, respectively. However, the
picture is somewhat different in that the Keycite figures are not
substantially different depending on the composition of the panels
(19.4% compared to 18.1%). The outcome-based measure yields
somewhat different results (42.4% compared to 35.3%), although this
difference is not statistically significant, either. Despite the absence of
statistically significant differences between Democratic- and Republicandominated majorities, the outcome-based measure still produces higher
estimates of non-compliance than Keycite.
In general, the analysis using the outcome-based measure of
compliance reaches results similar to those obtained by Keycite, although
the estimates of non-compliance are typically twice the estimates
produced by the Keycite measure. These findings are consistent with
46

See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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those of McClurg and Comparato.47 They concluded that the outcomebased measure of compliance is biased toward non-compliance and that
Keycite is biased toward compliance. Given the similarity in the results
of the two studies, it is probably safe to conclude that the 39.3% figure
derived using the outcome-based measure is a somewhat inflated
estimate of non-compliance. A content-based measure of noncompliance would probably yield an overall non-compliance estimate
somewhere between 39.3% and 18.8%.48 The same probably holds for
estimates of non-compliance based on the explanatory variables. The
patterns observed in the data analysis also appear if one uses the Keycite
measure of non-compliance, suggesting that, despite measurement error,
the outcome-based measure is tracking the concept of compliance.49
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article addresses an important empirical question for scholars
of the federal courts of appeals, namely, whether courts of appeals judges
actually comply with circuit norms regarding precedents established in
published panel decisions. It finds, inter alia, that judges are no more
likely to comply than not to comply with cited circuit precedent in cases
decided by published opinion, measuring compliance by the policy
direction of the precedent and subsequent case. This is an interesting
finding, suggesting that judges’ policy preferences do matter in published
cases, regardless of circuit precedent. A different picture emerges in
unpublished cases, in which precedent policy direction is the important
explanatory variable. These findings may not be surprising to certain
persons, including practitioners, based on their personal experiences and
a wealth of anecdotal evidence. This Article, however, presents
systematic evidence that these experiences and anecdotes reflect more
general phenomena. Judges clearly have greater discretion in certain
cases to reach decisions more in keeping with their policy preferences,
and they appear to take advantage of these opportunities. Circuit
precedent matters, but it is hardly the whole story.

47

See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
Again, it is not clear that one could formulate a content-based measure to cover the
broad range of cases included in the present study. In addition, it must be remembered
that the sample excludes citations to precedent without discussion, such as those in string
citations, when not coded by Keycite as “negative” treatment. See supra Part II.B. In
short, all these figures of non-compliance are inflated compared to a hypothetical sample
including all subsequent citations, no matter how minimal.
49
The Keycite measure (negative or positive treatment) is positively correlated with
a variable measuring whether the citing case is decided in the same direction as the cited
precedent (r = .305, significant at the .001 level).
48
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On a more theoretical level, this Article is part of a much larger
effort to model courts of appeals decision-making.50 The leading models
of judicial decision-making are based, either explicitly or implicitly, on
Supreme Court justices.51 But these justices occupy a rather special place
in the judicial hierarchy—namely, the top. Judges on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals occupy a much more difficult position to conceptualize—the
middle. Intermediate judges must cope with both vertical and horizontal
precedents. Vertical precedents can swiftly unsettle well-settled circuit
precedent.52 Moreover, unlike Supreme Court justices, courts of appeals
judges are not generally free to consider overruling horizontal
precedents. This Article, however, suggests that circuit precedent is not a
significant restraint on the pursuit of judicial policy preferences, at least
not in cases decided by published opinion. Additional research is
necessary to determine whether courts of appeals judges in the other
circuits treat circuit precedents in the same way as judges on the Sixth
Circuit; indeed, additional research on the Sixth Circuit is needed to
confirm the results reported in this Article. Future research along these
lines must work to refine measures of a number of concepts, including
compliance, and to determine just when judges on the federal courts of
appeals have policy discretion. This latter point is particularly important,
given the observed differences between published and unpublished cases.

50
See, e.g., Donald R. Songer et al., Do Judges Follow the Law When There Is No
Threat of Reversal? 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137, 138 (2003) (“[T]here seems to be a consensus
that in the lower federal courts, at least some judicial decisions are influenced by the
policy preferences of the judges, but that the exercise of discretion to advance one’s
policy preferences is constrained by statute, precedent, and other manifestations of the
law.”)
51
Over 20 years ago, Professor Howard warned scholars against “falling into the trap
of projecting the Supreme Court onto the whole judicial process and assuming that what
occurs in our least typical tribunal characterizes all of them.” J. WOODFORD HOWARD,
COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, xxi (1981). Despite this warning,
political science models still do not adequately address the lower courts. The premises of
the attitudinal model are clearly based on the position of Supreme Court justices at the
top of the federal judicial hierarchy. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 92-97 (2002) (explaining how
the rules of the game free Supreme Court justices to decide cases based on their policy
preferences). Rational choice theories also typically treat Supreme Court Justice strategic
behavior only. See generally, LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE
(1998) (applying rational choice theory to behavior of Supreme Court justices); FORREST
MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME
(2000).
52
For a discussion of “disruptive” Supreme Court precedents, see Emery G. Lee III,
Policy Windows on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 24 JUSTICE SYS. J. 301, 301, 307-09
(2003).
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